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Abstract—Code flaws or vulnerabilities are prevalent in soft-
ware systems and can potentially cause a variety of problems in-
cluding deadlock, information loss, or system failure. A variety of
approaches have been developed to try and detect the most likely
locations of such code vulnerabilities in large code bases. Most of
them rely on manually designing features (e.g. complexity metrics
or frequencies of code tokens) that represent the characteristics
of the code. However, all suffer from challenges in sufficiently
capturing both semantic and syntactic representation of source
code, an important capability for building accurate prediction
models. In this paper, we describe a new approach, built upon
the powerful deep learning Long Short Term Memory model,
to automatically learn both semantic and syntactic features in
code. Our evaluation on 18 Android applications demonstrates
that the prediction power obtained from our learned features
is equal or even superior to what is achieved by state of the
art vulnerability prediction models: 3%–58% improvement for
within-project prediction and 85% for cross-project prediction.
I. INTRODUCTION
A software vulnerability – a security flaw, glitch, or weak-
ness found in software systems – can potentially cause signifi-
cant damages to businesses and people’s lives, especially with
the increasing reliance on software in all areas of our society.
For instance, the Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL exposed
in 2014 has affected billions of Internet users [1]. Cyberattacks
are constant threats to businesses, governments and consumers.
The rate and cost of a cyber breach is increasing rapidly with
annual cost to the global economy from cybercrime being
estimated at $400 billion [2]. In 2017, it is estimated that the
global security market is worth $120 billion [3]. Central to
security protection is the ability to detect and mitigate software
vulnerabilities early, especially before software release to
effectively prevent attackers from exploit them.
Software has significantly increased in both size and com-
plexity. Identifying security vulnerabilities in software code is
highly difficult since they are rare compared to other types
of software defects. For example, the infamous Heartbleed
vulnerability was caused only by two missing lines of code [4].
Finding software vulnerabilities is commonly referred to as
“searching for a needle in a haystack” [5]. Static analysis tools
have been routinely used as part of the security testing process
but they commonly generate a large number of false positives
[6, 7]. Dynamic analysis tools rely on detailed monitoring
of run-time properties including log files and memory, and
require a wide range of representative test cases to exercise
the application. Hence, standard practice still relies heavily on
domain knowledge to identify the most vulnerable part of a
software system for intensive security inspection.
Software engineers can be supported by automated tools
that explore remaining parts of the code base more likely
to contain vulnerabilities and raise an alert on these. Such
predictive models and tools can help prioritize effort and
optimize inspection and testing costs. They aim to increase
the likelihood of finding vulnerabilities and reduce the time
required by software engineers to discover vulnerabilities.
In addition, a predictive capability that identifies vulnerable
components early in the software lifecycle is a significant
achievement since the cost of finding and fixing errors in-
creases dramatically as the software lifecycle progresses.
A common approach to build vulnerability prediction mod-
els is by using machine learning techniques. A number of
features representing software code are selected for use as pre-
dictors for vulnerability. The most commonly used features in
previous work (e.g. [8]) are software metrics (e.g. size of code,
number of dependencies, and cyclomatic complexity), code
churn metrics (e.g. the number of code lines changed), and
developer activity. Those features cannot however distinguish
code regions of different semantics. In many cases, two pieces
of code may have the same complexity metrics but they behave
differently and and thus have different likelihood of vulnera-
bility to attack. Furthermore, the choice of which features are
selected as predictors is manually chosen by knowledgeable
domain experts, and may thus carry outdated experience and
underlying biases. In addition, in many situations handcrafted
features normally do not generalize well: features that work
well in a certain software project may not perform well in
other projects [9].
An emerging approach is treating software code as a form
of text and leveraging Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques to automatically extract features. Previous work
(e.g. [10]) has used Bag-of-Words (BoW) to represent a
source code file as a collection of code tokens associated with
frequencies. The terms are the features which are used as the
predictors for their vulnerability prediction model. Their set of
features are thus not fixed or pre-determined (as seen in the
software metric model), but rather depend on the vocabulary
used by developers. However, the BoW approach has two
major weaknesses. Firstly, it ignores the semantics of code
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tokens, e.g. fails to recognize the semantic relations between
“for” and “while”. Secondly, a bag of code tokens does not
necessarily capture the semantic structure of code, especially
its sequential nature.
The recent advances of deep learning models [11] in
machine learning offer a powerful alternative to software
metrics and BoW in representing software code. One of
the most widely-used deep learning models is Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) [12], a special kind of recurrent
neural networks that is highly effective in learning long-
term dependencies in sequential data such as text and speech.
LSTMs have demonstrated ground-breaking performance in
many applications such as machine translation, video analysis,
and speed recognition [11] .
This paper presents a novel deep learning-based approach
to automatically learn features for predicting vulnerabilities in
software code. We leverage LSTM to capture the long context
relationships in source code where dependent code elements
are scattered far apart. For example, pairs of code tokens that
are required to appear together due to programming language
specification (e.g. try and catch in Java) or due to API usage
specification (e.g. lock() and unlock()), but do not imme-
diately follow each other. The learned features sufficiently
represent both the semantics of code tokens (semantic features)
and the sequential structure of source code (syntactic features).
Our automatic feature learning approach eliminates the need
for manual feature engineering which occupies most of the
effort in traditional approaches. Results from our experiments
on 18 Java applications for the Android OS platform from a
public dataset [10] demonstrate that our approach is highly
effective in predicting vulnerabilities in code.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section,
we provide a motivation example. Section III provides a
brief background on vulnerability prediction and the neural
networks used in our model. We then present our approach
in Section IV, its implementation in Section V, report the
experiments to evaluate it in Section VI, and discuss the threats
to validity in Section VII. In Section VIII, we discuss related
work before summarizing the contributions of the paper and
outlines future work in Section IX.
II. MOTIVATION
Figure 1 shows two code listings in Java which was adapted
from [13]. Both pieces of code aim to avoid data corruption
in multi-threaded Java programs by protecting shared data
from concurrent modifications and accesses (e.g. file f this
example). They do so by using a reentrant mutual exclusion
lock l to enforce exclusive access to the file f . Here, a thread
executing this code means to acquire the lock before reading
file f , and then release the lock when it is done with the file
to allow other threads to access the file.
The use of such locking can however result in deadlocks.
Listing 1 in Figure 1 demonstrates an example of deadlock
vulnerabilities. While it reads file f , an exception (e.g. file
not found) may occur and control transfers to the catch block.
Hence, the call to unlock() never gets executed, and thus it
1 t r y {
2 l . l o c k ( )
3 r e a d F i l e ( f ) ;
4 l . u n l oc k ( ) ;
5 }
6 c a t c h ( E x c e p t i o n e ) {
7 / / Do some th ing
8 }
9 f i n a l l y {
10 c l o s e F i l e ( f ) ;
11 }
Listing 1: File1.java
1 l . l o c k ( )
2 t r y {
3 r e a d F i l e ( f ) ;
4 }
5 c a t c h ( E x c e p t i o n e ) {
6 / / Do some th ing
7 }
8 f i n a l l y {
9 l . un l oc k ( ) ;
10 c l o s e F i l e ( f ) ;
11 }
Listing 2: File2.java
Fig. 1: A motivating example
fails to release the lock. An unreleased lock in a thread will
prevent other threads from acquiring the same lock, leading
to a deadlock situation. Deadlock is a serious vulnerability,
which can be exploited by attackers to organise Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. This type of attack can slow or prevent
legitimate users from accessing a software system.
Listing 2 in Figure 1 rectifies this vulnerability. It fixes the
problem of the lock not being released by calling unlock()
in the finally block. Hence, it guarantees that the lock is
released regardless of whether or not an exception occurs.
In addition, the code ensures that the lock is held when the
finally block executes by acquiring the lock (calling lock())
immediately before the try block.
The two code listings are identical with respect to both
software metric and Bag-of-Words measures used by most
current predictive and machine learning approaches. The num-
ber of code lines, the number of conditions, variables, and
branches are the same in both listings. The code tokens and
their frequencies are also identical in both pieces of code.
Hence, the two code listings are indistinguishable if either
software metrics or BoW are used as features. Existing work
which relies on those features would fail to recognize that the
left-hand side listing contains a vulnerability while the right-
hand side does not.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Vulnerability prediction
Vulnerability prediction typically involves determining
whether a source code file is likely to be vulnerable. The goal
is to alert software engineers with parts of the code base that
deserve particular attention, rather than pinpointing exactly the
code line where a vulnerability is resided. Hence, we also
choose to work at the level of files since this is also the scope
of existing work (e.g. [8, 10]) which we would like to compare
our approach against.
Determining if a source file is vulnerable can be considered
as a function vuln(x) which takes as input a file x and returns
a boolean value: true indicates that the file is vulnerable,
while false indicates that the file is clean. Machine learning
techniques have been widely used to learn function vuln(x).
To make it mathematically and computationally convenient for
machine learning algorithms, file x needs to be represented
as a n-dimensional vector where each dimension represents a
feature (or predictor).
B. Recurrent Neural Network and Long Short Term Memory
A Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [14] is a single-
hidden-layer neural network repeated multiple times. While
a feedforward neural network maps an input vector into an
output vector, an RNN maps a sequence into a sequence
(see Figure 2). Let w1, ...,wn be the input sequence (e.g.
code tokens) and y1, ...,yn be the sequence of corresponding
labels (e.g. the next code tokens). At each step t, a standard
RNN model reads the input wt and the previous output state
st−1 to compute the output state st as follows.
st = σ (b+Wtranst−1 +Winwt) (1)
where σ is a nonlinear element-wise transform function, and
b, Wtran and Win are referred to as model parameters. The
output state is used to predict the output (e.g. the next code
token based on the previous ones) at each step t.
LSTM LSTM LSTM ...
w1 w2 w3
s1 s2 s3
s1 s2 LSTM
w4
s4
try { l .
LSTM
wn
sn
... }
{ l . ...lock <eos>
Fig. 2: A recurrent neural network
An RNN shares the same parameters across all steps since
the same task is performed at each step, just with different
inputs. Hence, using an RNN significantly reduces the total
number of model parameters which we need to learn. The
RNN model is trained using many input sequences with known
true output sequences. The errors between the true outputs
and the predicted outputs are passed backwards through the
network during training to adjust the model parameters such
that the errors are minimized.
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Fig. 3: The internal structure of an LSTM unit
A Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [12, 15] architecture
is a special variant of RNN, which is capable of learning
long-term dependencies. Due to space limitations, we briefly
describe LSTM here and refer the readers to the seminal
paper [12] for more details. It has a memory cell ct which
stores accumulated memory of the context. The amount of
information flowing through the memory cell is controlled by
three gates (an input gate it, a forget gate ft, and an output
gate ot), each of which returns a value between 0 (i.e. complete
blockage) and 1 (full passing through). All those gates are
learnable, i.e. being trained with the whole code corpus. It is
important to note here that LSTM computes the output state
based on not just only the current input wt and the previous
ouput state ht−1 (as done in standard RNNs) but also the
current memory cell state ct, which is linear with the previous
memory ct−1. This is the key feature allowing an LSTM model
to learn long-term dependencies.
IV. APPROACH
A. Overview
Our process of automatically learning and extracts both
syntactic and semantic features goes through multiple steps
(see Figure 4). These features used to build a classifier for
vulnerability prediction. We consider each Java source file as
consisting of a header (which contains a declaration of class
variables) and a set of methods. We treat a header as a special
method (method 0). We parse the code within each method into
a sequence of code tokens, which is fed into into a Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) system to learn a vector representation
of the method (i.e. method features). This important step
transforms a variable-size sequence of code tokens into a fixed-
size feature vector in a multi-dimensional space. In addition,
for each input code token, the trained LSTM system also gives
us a so-called token state, which captures the distributional
semantics of the code token in its context of use.
Header 
(Method 0)
Method 1
Method 2
Method N
.
.
.
LSTM
Statistical Pooling
Token sequence
Vulnerability outcome
.
.
.
Source code file
LSTM
Prediction
Token sequence
Syntactic 
features
Tokenize
Tokenize
Classifier
CodebookBag of token states
Semantic pooling
Semantic 
features
Method 
features
Method 
features
Fig. 4: Overview of our approach for automatic feature learn-
ing for vulnerability prediction based on LSTM. The codebook
is constructed from all bags of token states in all projects, and
the process is detailed in Fig. 6
After this step, we obtain a set of method feature vectors,
one for each method in a file. The next step is aggregating
those feature vectors into a single feature vector. The aggrega-
tion operation is known as pooling. For example, the simplest
statistical pooling method is mean-pooling where we take the
sum of the method vectors and divide it by the number of
methods in a file. More complex pooling methods can be used
and we will discuss it in more detail. This step produces a set
of syntactic features for a file.
Those learned syntactic features are however local to a
project. For example, method names and variables are typically
project-specific. Hence, using only those features alone may
be effective for within-project prediction but may not be suffi-
cient for cross-project settings. Our approach therefore learns
another set of features to address this generalization issue. To
do so, we build up a universal bag of token states from all files
across all the studied projects. We then automatically group
those code token states into a number of clusters based on
their semantic closeness. The centroids in those clusters form
a so-called “codebook”, which is used for generating a set of
semantic features for a file through a semantic pooling process.
We will now describe each of these steps in details.
B. Parsing source code
We use Java Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) to extract syntactic
information from source code. To do so, we utilize JavaParser
[16] to lexically analyze each source file and obtain an AST.
Each source file is parsed into a set of methods and each
method is parsed into a sequence of code tokens. All class
attributes (i.e. the header) are grouped into a sequence of
tokens. Comments and blank lines are ignored. Following
standard practice (e.g. as done in [17]), we replace integers,
real numbers, exponential notation, and hexadecimal numbers
with a generic 〈num〉 token, and replace constant strings with
a generic 〈str〉 token. We also replace less popular tokens (e.g.
occurring only once in the corpus) and tokens which exist in
test sets but do not exist in the training set with a special token
〈unk〉. A fixed-size vocabulary V is constructed based on
top N popular tokens, and rare tokens are assigned to 〈unk〉.
Doing this makes our corpus compact but still provides partial
semantic information.
C. Learning code token semantics
After the parsing and tokenizing process, each method is
now a sequence of code tokens 〈w1, w2, ..., wn〉. The files in
training set give us a large number sequences of code tokens,
which are input to an LSTM system. An LSTM unit takes as
input a vector representing a code token. Hence, we need to
convert each code token into a fixed-length continuous vector.
This process is known as code token embedding. We do so by
maintaining a token embedding matrix M ∈ Rd×|V | where
d is the size of a code token vector and |V | is the size of
vocabulary V . Each code token has an index in the vocabulary,
and this embedding matrix acts as a look-up table: each
column ith in the embedding matrix is an embedded vector
for the token ith. We denote xt as a vector representation of
code token wt. For example, token “try” is converted in vector
[0.1, 0.3, -0.2] in the example in Figure 5.
The code sequence vectors that make up each method are
then input to a sequence of LSTM units. Specifically, each
token vector xt in a sequence 〈x1,x2, ...,xn〉 is input into
an LSTM unit (see Figure 5). As LSTM is a recurrent net,
LSTM
try 
[0.1 0.3 ‐0.2]
{
[‐1 ‐2.1 0.5]
l
[1.5 0.5 ‐1.2]
{ l .
[1 ‐0.5 ‐3] [‐1.3 0 2] [‐0.5 ‐0.5 ‐1]
[‐0.27 ‐0.33 ‐0.67]
LSTMLSTM
Sequence embedding
Code token embedding
Output token states
Statistical Pooling
Fig. 5: An example of how a vector representation is obtained
for a code sequence
all the LSTM units share the same model parameters. Each
unit computes the output state st for an input token xt. For
example in Figure 5, the output state vector for code token
“try” is [0.1, 0.3, -0.2]. The size of this vector can be different
from the size of the input token vector (i.e. d 6= d′), but for
simplicity in training the model we assume they are the same.
The state vectors are used to predict the next tokens using
another token weight matrix denoted as U ∈ Rd′×|V |.
LSTM automatically learns both model parameters, the
token weight matrix U and the code token embedding matrix
M by maximizing the likelihood of predicting the next code
token in the training data. Specifically, we use the output state
vector of code token wt to predict the next code token wt+1
from a context of earlier code tokens w1:t by computing a
posterior distribution:
P (wt+1 = k | w1:t) =
exp
(U>k st)∑
k′
exp
(U>k′st) (2)
where k is the index of token wt+1 in the vocabulary, U>
is the transpose of matrix U , and U>k indicates the vector in
column kth of U>, and k′ runs through all the indices in
the vocabulary, i.e. k′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., |V |}. This learning style
essentially estimates a language model of code. Thus the
LSTM automatically learns a grammar of code [18].
1) Model training: LSTM can automatically train itself
using code sequences in all the methods extracted from
our dataset. During training, for every token in a sequence
〈w1, w2, ..., wn〉, we know the true next token. For example,
the true next token after “try” is “{” in the example Figure
5. We use this information to learn the model parameters
which maximize the accuracy of our next token predictions.
To measure the accuracy, we use the log-loss (i.e. the cross
entropy) of each true next token, i.e. − logP (w1) for token
w1, − logP (w2 | w1) for token w2, ..., − logP (wn | w1:n−1)
for token wn. The model is then trained using many known
sequences of code tokens in a dataset by minimizing the
following sum log-loss in each sequence:
L(P) = − logP (w1)−
n−1∑
t=1
logP (wt+1 | w1:t) (3)
which is essentially − logP (w1, w2, ..., wn).
Learning involves computing the gradient of L(P) during
the back propagation phase, and updating the model param-
eters P , which consists of M, U and other internal LSTM
parameters, via stochastic gradient descent.
2) Generating output token states: Once the training phase
has been completed we use the learned LSTM to compute a
code token state vector st for every code token wt extracted
in our dataset. The use of LSTM ensures that a code token
state contains information from other code tokens that come
before it. Thus, a code token state captures the distributional
semantics, a Natural Language Processing concept which
dictates that the meaning of a word (code token) is defined by
its context of use [19]. The same lexical token can theoretically
be realized in infinite number of usage contexts. Hence a
token semantics is a point in the semantic space defined by
all possible token usages. The token states are then used for
generating two distinct sets of features for a file.
D. Generating syntactic features
Generating syntactic features for a file involves two steps.
First, we generate a set of features for each method in the
file. To do so, we first extract a sequence of code tokens
〈w1, w2, ..., wn〉 from a method, feed it into the trained
LSTM system, and obtain an output sequence of token states
〈s1, s2, ..., sn〉 (see Section IV-C2). We then compute the
method feature vector by aggregating all the token states
in the same sequence so that all information from the start
to the end of a method is accumulated (see Figure 5).
This process is known as pooling and there are multiple
ways to perform pooling, but the main requirement is that
pooling must be length invariant, that is, pooling is not
sensitive to variable method lengths. We employ a number
of simple but often effective statistical pooling methods: (1)
Mean pooling, i.e. s¯ = 1n
n∑
t=1
st; (2) Variance pooling, i.e.,
σ =
√
1
n
n∑
t=1
(st − s¯) ∗ (st − s¯), where ∗ denotes element-
wise multiplication; and (3) A concatenation of both mean
pooling and variance pooling, i.e. [s¯,σ].
Since a file contains multiple methods, the next step involves
aggregating all these method vectors a single vector for file.
We employ again another statistical pooling mechanism to
generate a set of syntactic features for the file.
E. Generating semantic features
Syntactic features are useful for within-project vulnerability
prediction since they are local to a method and thus tend to be
project-specific. To enable effective cross-project prediction,
we need another set of features for a file which reflect how
the file positions in a semantic space across all projects. We
view a file as a set of code token states (generated from the
LSTM system), each of which captures the semantic structure
of the token usage contexts. This is different from viewing
the file as a Bag-of-Words where a code token is nothing
but an index in the vocabulary, regardless of its usage. We
partition this set of token states into subsets, each of which
corresponds to a distinct region in the semantic space. Suppose
there are k regions, each file is then represented as a vector
of k dimensions. Each dimension is the number of token state
vectors that fall into the respective region.
The next question is how to partition the semantic space
into a number of regions. To do so, we borrow the concept
from computer vision by considering each token in a file as
an analogy for a salient point (i.e. the most informative point
in an image). The token states are akin to the set of point
descriptors such as SIFT [20]. The main difference here is that
in vision, visual descriptors are calculated manually, whereas
in our setting token states are learnt automatically through
LSTM. In vision, descriptors are clustered into a set of points
called codebook (not to be confused with the software source
code), which is essentially the descriptor centroids.
1
3
2
Codebook = {centroids}
1
3
2
(C) A new file
(D) Centroid assignment
[3,2,5]
(E) File semantic features
(B) Codebook construction (k=3)
All token states in training set
Token states
(A) Training files
Fig. 6: An example of using “codebook” to automatically learn
and generate file semantic features
Similarly, we can build a codebook that summarizes all
token states, i.e. the semantic space, across all projects in
our dataset. Each “code” in the codebook represents a distinct
region in the semantic space. We construct a codebook by
using k-means to cluster all state vectors in the training set,
where k is the pre-defined number of centroids, and hence
the size of the codebook (see Part A in Figure 6, each small
circle representing a token state in the space). The example
in Figure 6 uses k = 3 to produce three state clusters. For
each new file, we obtain all the state vectors (Part B in Figure
6) and assign each of them to the closest centroids (Part C
in Figure 6). The file is represented as a vector of length k,
whose elements are the number of centroid occurrences. For
example, the new file in Figure 6 has 10 token vectors. We
then compute the distances between those vectors to the three
centroids established in the training set. We find that 3 of them
are closest to centroid #1, 2 to centroid #2 and 5 to centroid
#3. Hence, the feature vector for the new file is [3, 2, 5].
This technique provides a powerful abstraction over a num-
ber of tokens in a file. The intuition here is that the number of
tokens in an entire dataset could be large but the number of
usage context types (i.e. the token state clusters) can be small.
Hence, an file can be characterized by the types of the usage
contexts which it contains. This approach offers an efficient
and effective way to learn new features for a file from the
code tokens constituting it. In effect, a file is a collection of
distinct regions in the semantic space of code tokens.
F. Vulnerability prediction
Using the process above, we generate both syntactic and
semantic features for each file in both the training data and the
test data. We then use the standard process described in Section
III-A to build and train vulnerability prediction models. Files
in the test data are used to assess the performance of the trained
prediction models.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed approach is implemented in Theano [21] and
Keras[22] frameworks, running in Python. Theano supports
automatic differentiation of the loss in Eq. (3) and a host
of powerful adaptive gradient descent methods. Keras is a
wrapper making model building much easier.
A. Training details
In particular we use RMSprop as the optimizer with learning
rate of 0.02, and smoothing hyper-parameters: ρ = 0.99,
 = 1e− 7. The model parameters are updated in a stochastic
fashion, that is, after every mini-batch of size 50. We use
|V | = 5, 000 most frequent tokens for learning the code
language model discussed in Section . We use dropout rate
of 0.5 at the hidden output of LSTM layer.
The dataset contains more than 240K sequences, in which,
200k sequences are used for training and the others are used
for validation. The LSTM which achieved the best perplexity
on validation set was finally kept for feature extraction.
The classifier is Random Forest implemented in the scikit-
learn toolkit. Hyper-parameters are tuned for best performance
include (i) the number of trees, (ii) the maximum depth of a
tree, (iii) the minimum number of samples required to split an
internal node and (iv) the maximum number of features per
tree. The code is run on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670 0 @
2.6GHz. There machine has two CPUs, each has 8 physical
cores or 16 threads, with a RAM of 128GB.
B. Handling large vocabulary
To evaluate the prediction probability in Eq. (2) we need to
iterate through all unique tokens in the vocabulary. Since the
vocabulary’s size is large, this can be highly expensive. To
tackle the issue, we employ an approximate method known
as Noise Contrastive Estimation [23], which approximates the
vocabulary at each probability evaluation by a small subset
of words randomly sampled from the vocabulary. We use 100
words, as it is known to work well in practice [24].
C. Handling long methods
Methods are variable in size. This makes learning inefficient
because we need to handle each method separately, not making
use of recent advances in Graphical Processing Units (GPUs).
A better way is to handle methods in mini-batch of fixed size.
A typical way is to pad short methods with dummy tokens so
that all methods in the same mini-batch have the same size.
However, since some methods are very long, this approach
will result in a waste of computational effort to handle dummy
tokens. Here we use a simple approach to split a long method
into non-overlapping sequences of fixed length T , where T =
100 is chosen in this implementation due to the faster learning
speed. For simplicity, features of a method are simply the mean
features of its sequences.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Datasets
To carry out our empirical evaluation, we exploited a
publicly available dataset [25] that has been used in previous
work [10] for vulnerability prediction. This dataset originally
contained 20 popular applications which were collected from
F-Droid and Android OS in 2011. The dataset covers a diver-
sity of application domains such as education, book, finance,
email, images and games. However, the provided dataset only
contained the application names, their versions (and dates),
and the file names and their vulnerability labels. It did not
have the source code for the files, which is needed for our
study. Using the provided file names and version numbers, we
then retrieved the relevant source files from the code repository
of each application.
TABLE I: Dataset statistics
App #Versions #Files Mean files Mean LOC Mean Vuln % Vuln
Crosswords 16 842 52 12,138 24 0.46
Contacts 6 787 131 39,492 40 0.31
Browser 6 433 72 23,615 27 0.37
Deskclock 6 127 21 4,384 10 0.47
Calendar 6 307 51 21,605 22 0.44
AnkiAndroid 6 275 45 21,234 27 0.59
Mms 6 865 144 35,988 54 0.37
Boardgamegeek 1 46 46 8,800 11 0.24
Gallery2 2 545 272 68,445 75 0.28
Connectbot 2 104 52 14,456 24 0.46
Quicksearchbox 5 605 121 15,580 26 0.22
Coolreader 12 423 35 14,708 17 0.49
Mustard 11 955 86 14,657 41 0.47
K9 19 2,660 140 50,447 65 0.47
Camera 6 457 76 16,337 29 0.38
Fbreader 13 3,450 265 32,545 78 0.30
Email 6 840 140 51,449 75 0.54
Keepassdroid 12 1,580 131 14,827 51 0.39
We could not find the code repository for two applications
since they appeared no longer available. For some apps, the
number of versions we could retrieve from the code repository
is less than that in the original datasets. For example, we
retrieve the source files for 16 versions of Crossword while
the original dataset had 17 versions. The source files for
some older versions were no longer maintained in the code
repository. Table I provides some descriptive statistics for 18
apps in our dataset, including the number of versions, the total
number of files, the average number of files in a version, the
average number of lines of code in a version, the average
number of vulnerable files in a version, and the ratio of
vulnerable files.
B. Research questions
We followed previous work in vulnerability prediction [10]
and aimed to answer the following standard research questions:
1) RQ1. Within-project prediction: Are the automatically
learned features using LSTM suitable for building a
vulnerability prediction model?
To answer this question, we focused on one version (the
first one) in each application in our dataset. We ran a
cross-fold validation experiments by dividing the files
in each application into 10 folds, each of which have
the approximately same ratio between vulnerable files
and clean files. Each fold is used as the test set and the
remaining folds are used for training. As a result, we
built 10 different prediction models and the performance
indicators are averaged out of the 10 folds.
2) RQ2. Cross-version prediction: How does our pro-
posed approach perform in predicting future releases,
i.e. when the model is trained using an older version in
application and tested on a newer version in the same
application?
In this second experiment, all the files in the first version
of each application are used to train a prediction model,
which is then used to predict vulnerability of the files of
all subsequent versions. For example, the first version in
the Crosswords app is used to training and each of the
remaining 15 versions is used as a test set.
3) RQ3. Cross-project prediction: Is our approach suit-
able for cross-project predictions where the model is
trained using a source application and tested on a
different application?
In the third experiment, we used all the files in the first
version of each project for training a prediction model.
This model is then tested on the first version of the
remaining applications.
C. Benchmarks
We compare the performance of our approach against the
following benchmarks:
Software metrics: Complexity metrics have been exten-
sively used for defect prediction (e.g. [26]) and vulnerability
prediction (e.g. [8, 27, 28]). This is resulted from the intuition
that complex code is difficult to understand, maintain and test,
and thus has a higher chance of having vulnerabilities than
simple code. We have implemented a vulnerability prediction
models based on 60 metrics. These features are commonly
used in existing vulnerability prediction models. They covers
7 categories: cohesion metrics, complexity metrics, coupling
metrics, documentation metrics, inheritance metrics, code du-
plication metrics, and size metrics.
Bag of Words: This technique has been used in previous
work [10], which also consider source code as a special form
of text. Hence, it treats a source file as a collection of terms
associated with frequencies. The term frequencies are the
features which are used as the predictors for a vulnerability
prediction model. Lexical analysis is done to source code to
break it into a vector of code tokens and the frequency of
each token in the file is counted. We also followed previous
work [10] by discretizing the BoW features since they found
that this method significantly improved the performance of
the vulnerability prediction models. The discretization process
involves transforming the numerical BoW features into two
bins. If a code token occurs more than a certain threshold
(e.g. 5 times) than it is mapped to one bin, otherwise it is
mapped to another bin.
Deep Belief Network: Recent work [29] has demonstrated
that Deep Belief Network (DBN) [30] worked well for defect
prediction. DBN is a family of stochastic deep neural networks
which extract multiple layers of data representation. In our
implementation, DBN takes the word counts per file as input
and produces a latent posterior as output, which is then used
as a new file representation. Since the standard DBN accepts
only input in the range [0,1], we normalize the word counts
by dividing each dimension to its maximum value accross
the entire training data. The DBN is then built in a stage-
wise fashion as follows. At the bottom layer, a Restricted
Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is trained on the normalized
word count. An RBM is a special two-layer neural network
with binary neurons. Following the standard practice in the
literature, the RBM is trained using Contrastive Divergence
[30]. After the first RBM is trained, its posterior is used as the
input for the next RBM, and the training is repeated. Finally,
the two RBMs are stacked on top of each other to form a DBN
with two hidden layers. The posterior of the second RBM is
used as the new file representation. In our implementation, the
two hidden layers have the size of 500 and 128, respectively.
To enable a fair comparison, we used the same classifier
for our prediction models and all the benchmarks. We chose
Random Forests (RF), an ensemble method which combines
the estimates from multiple estimators since it is one of
the most effective classifier for vulnerability prediction [10].
We employed the standard Precision, Recall, and F-measure,
which has been widely-used in the literature (e.g. [5, 8, 10,
28]) for evaluating the predictive performance of vulnerability
prediction models built using the three above benchmarks and
our approach.
D. Results
1) Learned code token semantics: An important part of
our approach is learning the semantics of code tokens using
the context of its usage through LSTM. Figure 7 show the
top 2,000 frequent code tokens used in our dataset. They
were automatically grouped in 10 clusters (using K-means
clustering) based on their token states learned through LSTM.
Recall that these clusters are the basis for us to construct a
codebook (discussed in Section IV-E). We used t-distributed
stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) [31] to display high-
dimensional vectors in two dimensions. We show here some
representative code tokens from some clusters for a brief
illustration. Code tokens that are semantically related are
grouped in the same cluster. For example, code tokens related
to exceptions such as IllegalArgumentException, FileNot-
FoundException, and NoSuchMethodException are grouped
TABLE II: Within-project results (RQ1) for the three benchmarks and three variations of our approach. “Joint features” indicates
the use of both syntactic features and semantic features.
Application Software metrics Bag-of-Words Deep Belief Network Syntactic features Semantic features Joint featuresP R F P R F P R F P R F P R F P R F
AnkiAndroid 0.62 0.65 0.61 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.96
Boardgamegeek 0.18 0.35 0.23 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Browser 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.98
Calendar 0.52 0.43 0.45 0.89 0.80 0.83 1.00 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
Camera 0.72 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.87 0.88 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.94
Connectbot 0.65 0.73 0.64 0.97 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.88 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.93 0.93
Contacts 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.81 0.83 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.97 0.90
Coolreader 0.55 0.70 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.96
Crosswords 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.83 0.85
Deskclock 0.30 0.20 0.23 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.94
Email 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93
Fbreader 0.60 0.52 0.55 0.78 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.86 0.83
Gallery2 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.80 0.91 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.83
K9 0.73 0.82 0.76 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.96 0.87 0.90 0.89 1.00 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.98 0.92
Keepassdroid 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88
Mms 0.78 0.60 0.67 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.89
Mustard 0.81 0.68 0.72 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.89 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.96
Quicksearchbox 0.60 0.42 0.43 0.84 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.90 0.84 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.77 0.82 0.89 0.79 0.82
Average 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.91
in one cluster. This indicates, to some extent, that the learned
token states effectively capture the semantic relations between
code tokens, which is useful for us to learn both syntactic and
semantic features later.
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Fig. 7: Top 2,000 frequent code tokens were automatically
grouped into clusters (each cluster has a distinct color)
2) Within-project prediction (RQ1): We experimented with
a number of variations of our approach by varying the pooling
techniques (mean pooling and standard deviation pooling) and
the use of syntactic and semantic features. Table II reports
the precision, recall and F-measure for the three benchmarks
(software metrics, Bag-of-Words, and Deep Belief Network)
and three variations of our approach: using only syntactic
features, using only semantic features, and using a joint set
of both features types. Note that both the syntactic feature
option and and the joint feature option we reported here used
mean pooling for generating method features and standard
deviation pooling for generating syntactic file features. The full
report which contains the results for all variations of pooling
is available at https://goo.gl/OnRnPp.
Our approach obtained a strong result: in all 18 applications,
they all achieved more than 80% in precision, recall, and
F-measure (see Table II). Among the three variation of our
approach, using only syntactic features appeared to be the
best option for vulnerable prediction within one version of
a project. This option delivered the highest precision, recall
and F-measure averaging across 18 applications. This result is
consistent with our underlying theory that syntactic features
are project-specific and are thus useful for within-project
prediction. Our approach outperforms the three benchmarks
to varying extents. The syntactic feature option offered 58%
F-measure improvement over the software metrics approach.
Both Bag-of-Words (BoW) and Deep Belief Network ap-
proaches also achieved very good results (on average 89–90%
F-measure) – which is consistent with the findings in previous
work [10] in case of BoW. Hence, comparing against these
two benchmarks, the improvement brought by our approach is
small (approximately 3% in F-measure).
3) Cross-version prediction (RQ2): Table III reports the
results in a cross-version setting where a prediction model
was trained using the first version of an application and
tested using the subsequent versions of the same applica-
tions. Our approach again slightly outperforms the BoW and
DBN benchmarks. Among the three variations, using semantic
features (alone or joint with syntactic features) becomes the
best options. This is because semantic measures improve
the generalization of the prediction models, which becomes
slightly more useful in cross-version settings.
4) Cross-project prediction (RQ3): This experiment fol-
lowed the setup in previous work [10]. We first built 18
prediction models, each of which use the first version of each
application for training. Each model was then tested using
the first version of the other 17 applications. We ran this
experiment with the three benchmarks and variations of our
approach. We used the same baseline as in previous work
TABLE III: Cross-version results (RQ2) for the three benchmarks and three variations of our approach. “Joint features” indicates
the use of both syntactic features and semantic features.
Application Software metrics Bag-of-Words Deep Belief Network Syntactic features Semantic features Joint featuresP R F P R F P R F P R F P R F P R F
AnkiAndroid 0.80 0.71 0.75 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.88
Browser 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.75 0.63 0.68 0.75 0.65 0.70 0.59 0.64 0.61 0.84 0.57 0.68 0.82 0.58 0.68
Calendar 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.89 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.82
Camera 0.51 0.81 0.62 0.60 0.90 0.72 0.58 0.89 0.70 0.65 0.84 0.73 0.67 0.88 0.76 0.84 0.80 0.82
Connectbot 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Contacts 0.68 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.60 0.80 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.71
Coolreader 0.80 0.77 0.78 0.93 0.79 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.92 0.86 0.89
Crosswords 0.87 0.72 0.79 0.90 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.83 0.87
Deskclock 0.87 0.66 0.75 0.89 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.76 0.81 0.93 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.86
Email 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.90 0.86
Fbreader 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.85
Gallery2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97
K9 0.77 0.89 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.98 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.90
Keepassdroid 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.95
Mms 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.94
Mustard 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97
Quicksearchbox 0.57 0.69 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.56 0.79 0.66 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.82
Average 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87
[10]: a model is applicable to a tested application if both
precision and recall are above 80%. For each application,
Table IV reports the number of other applications to which
the corresponding models can be applied.
TABLE IV: Cross-project results (RQ3) for the three bench-
marks and three variations of our approach.
App Metrics BoW DBN Syntactic Semantic Joint
AnkiAndroid 1 2 2 3 7 5
Boardgamegeek 0 1 1 0 1 1
Browser 0 1 2 0 0 1
Calendar 0 1 1 1 4 5
Camera 1 3 2 3 6 6
Connectbot 0 2 2 4 4 5
Contacts 0 1 3 1 2 2
Coolreader 1 2 3 4 4 6
Crosswords 0 3 3 2 1 1
Deskclock 0 1 1 0 1 1
Email 1 2 2 4 4 4
Fbreader 0 2 2 4 6 6
Gallery2 0 3 2 3 3 2
K9 1 3 3 2 7 8
Keepassdroid 0 3 1 4 2 4
Mms 0 4 2 3 5 6
Mustard 0 3 3 3 8 8
Quicksearchbox 0 2 2 1 3 3
Average 0.3 2.2 2.1 2.3 3.8 4.1
The results suggest that using semantic features really
improve the general applicability of prediction models. All
the models using both semantic and syntactic features were
successfully applicable to at least one other application. Some
of them (e.g. K9 and Mustard) are even applicable to 8
other applications. In this cross-project prediction setting,
our approach also offers bigger improvements over the BoW
and DBN benchmarks. On average, a joint-feature model
is applicable to around 4 other applications, which is 85%
improvement compared with BoW or DBN models.
E. Remarks and implications
The high performance of BoW on within-project prediction
(RQ1 and RQ2) is not totally surprising for two reasons. One
is that BoW has been known as a strong representation for text
classification, and source code is also a type of text written in
programming languages. The other reason is that although the
train files and test files are not identical, a project typically
has many versions, and the new versions of the same file
may carry a significant amount of information from the old
versions. The repeated information can come from multiple
forms: fully repeated pieces of code, the same BoW statsistics,
or the same code convention and style. Thus any representation
that is sufficiently expressive and coupled with highly flexible
classifiers such as Random Forests, will likely to work well.
However, this is not the case for cross-project prediction
(RQ3). This is when the BoW statistics are likely to be
different between projects, and knowledge learned from one
project may not transfer well to others. In machine learning
and data mining, this problem is known as domain adaptation,
where each project is a domain. The common approach is to
learn the common representation across domains, upon which
classifiers will be built. This is precisely what is done using
the LSTM-based language model and codebook construction.
Note that the LSTM and codebook are learned using all
available data without supervision. This suggests that we can
actually use external data, even if there are no vulnerability
labels. The competitive performance of the proposed deep
learning approach clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of
this representation learning.
To conclude, when doing within-project prediction, it is
useful to use BoW due to its simplicity. But when generalizing
from one project to another, it is better to use representation
learning. We recommend using LSTM for language model,
and codebook for semantic structure discovery.
VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
There are a number of threats to the validity of our study,
which we discuss below.
Construct validity: We mitigated the construct validity
concerns by using a publicly available dataset that has been
used in previous work [10]. The dataset contains real Android
applications and vulnerability labels of the files in those appli-
cations. The original dataset did not unfortunately contain the
source files. However, we have carefully used the information
(e.g. application details, version numbers and date) provided
with the dataset to retrieve the relevant source files from the
code repository of those applications.
Conclusion validity: We tried to minimize threats to con-
clusion validity by using standard performance measures for
vulnerability prediction [8, 10, 28, 32]. We however acknowl-
edge that a number of statistical tests [33] can be applied to
verify the statistical significance of our conclusions. Although
we have not seen those statistical tests being used in previous
work in vulnerability prediction, we plan to do this investiga-
tion in our future work.
Internal validity: The dataset we used contains vulnerabil-
ity labels only for Java source files. In practice, other files (e.g.
XML manifest files) may contain security information such
as access rights. Another threat concerns the cross-version
prediction where we replicated the experiment done in [10]
and allowed that the exactly same files might be present
between versions. This might have inflated the results, but
all the prediction models which we compared against in our
experiment benefit from this.
External validity: We have considered a large number
of applications which differ significantly in size, complexity,
domain, popularity and revision history. We however acknowl-
edge that our data set may not be representative of all kinds
of Android applications. Further investigation to confirm our
findings for other Android applications as well as other types
of applications such as web applications and applications
written in other programming languages such as PhP and C++.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Machine learning techniques have been widely used to
build vulnerability prediction models. Early approaches (e.g.
[27]) employed complexity metrics such as (e.g. McCabe’s
cyclomatic complexity, nesting complexity, and size) as the
predictors. Later approaches enriched this software metric
feature set with coupling and cohesion metrics (e.g. [28]),
code churn and developer activity metrics (e.g. [8])), and
dependencies and organizational measures (e.g. [5]). Those ap-
proaches require knowledgeable domain experts to determine
the metrics that are used as predictors for vulnerability.
Recent approaches treat source code as another form of text
and leverage text mining techniques to extract the features
for building vulnerability prediction models. The work in [10]
used the Bag-of-Words representation in which a source code
file is viewed as a set of terms with associated frequen-
cies. They then used the term-frequencies as the features for
predicting vulnerability. The BoW approach eliminates the
need for manually designing the features. BoW models also
produced higher recall than software metric models for PHP
applications [32]. However, the BoW approaches carries the
inherent limitation of BoW in which syntactic information
such as code order is disregarded.
Predicting vulnerabilities is related to software defect pre-
diction. The study in [34] found that some defect prediction
models can be adapted for vulnerability prediction. While code
metrics were commonly used as features for building defect
prediction models [26], various other metrics have also been
employed such as change-related metrics [35, 36], developer-
related metrics [37], organization metrics [38], and change
process metrics [39]. Recently, a number of approaches (e.g.
[29, 40]) have leveraged a deep learning model called Deep
Belief Network [41] to automatically learn features for defect
prediction.
Deep learning has recently attracted increasing interests in
software engineering. The work in [42] proposes generic deep
learning framework based on LSTM for modeling software
and its development process. The work in [17] demonstrated
the effectiveness of using recurrent neural networks (RNN)
to model source code. Their later work [43] extended these
RNN models for detecting code clones. The work in [44] uses
a special RNN Encoder–Decoder, which consists of an encoder
RNN to process the input sequence and a decoder RNN with
attention to generate the output sequence, to generate API
usage sequences for a given API-related natural language
query. The work in [45] also uses RNN Encoder–Decoder
but for fixing common errors in C programs. The work [24]
showed that LSTM is even more effective in code modeling,
which inspired us to use it for learning vulnerability features.
The work in [46] uses Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
[47] for bug localization.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes to leverage Long-Short Term Memory,
a representation deep learning model, to automatically learn
features directly from source code for vulnerability prediction.
The learned syntactic features capture the sequential struc-
ture in code at the method level, while semantic features
characterize a source code file by usage contexts of its code
tokens. We performed an evaluation on 18 Android applica-
tions from a public dataset provided in previous work [10].
The results for within-project prediction demonstrate that the
automatically learned features significantly outperforms the
traditional software metrics approach (58% improvement on
average), and offers a small improvement (3% on average)
over the Bag-of-Word approach and another deep learning
approach (Deep Belief Network). For cross-project prediction,
the results suggest that our approach is clearly superior to these
state-of-the-art techniques (85% improvement on average).
Our future work involves applying the proposed approach
to other types of applications (e.g. Web applications) and
programming languages (e.g. PHP or C++) where vulnerability
datasets are available. We also aim to leverage our approach
to learn features for predicting vulnerabilities at the method
and code change levels. In addition, we plan to explore how
our approach can be extended to predicting general defects and
safety-critical hazards in code. Finally, our future investigation
involves building a fully end-to-end prediction system from
raw input data (code tokens) to vulnerability outcomes.
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